We study market liberalisation under imperfect competition in the presence of price e¤ects. For this purpose, we build a three-country model of international trade under monopolistic competition. The neighbouring e¤ect translates how the size e¤ect propagates across countries. When some country increases in size, its relative wage increases, as well as that in a small and near country, while that in a large and distant country falls. We also show that a preferential trade agreement increases the relative wage, the welfare, and the terms-of-trade in the partner countries, where the integration e¤ect dominates, while lowering those in the third country.
In imperfect competition models of international trade, the existence of a costlessly traded homogeneous good sector has often been assumed, especially when dealing with multi-country models. This leads to Factor Price Equalisation (FPE) across countries, which signi…cantly simpli…es the analysis. 1 In that context, markets integrate via the relocation of …rms and workers across countries, see Krugman (1980) , Baldwin et al. (2003) , Behrens et al. (2007) , Venables (1987) , or Ossa (2011) . By focusing on the consequences of production shifting and of the relocation of industry, that line of research abstracts completely from any price e¤ect present during the liberalisation process. In particular, it assumes away terms-of-trade considerations and their impact on welfare. Moreover, in the real world, FPE does not hold, even between developed countries. 2 In this paper, we address the consequences of market liberalisation in a framework dealing with size, neighbouring, price, and integration e¤ects. For this purpose, following Venables (1987) and Ossa (2011) , among others, we build on Krugman's (1980) new trade theory to construct a three-country model of international trade under monopolistic competition. In contrast to the existing literature, we relax the assumption of FPE by removing the costlessly traded good sector, so that prices and wages are endogenous, and price e¤ects are included into the analysis. As our framework deals with an arbitrary trade cost structure between countries, our results go beyond the analysis of speci…c examples such as the symmetric or the hub-andspoke con…gurations studied by Puga and Venables (1997) . Moreover, unlike in Ossa (2011) , no trade restriction is placed between countries. Hence, our model deals with general trade patterns allowing for asymmetries in country sizes and trade costs. 1 FPE is a direct consequence of costless trade in the constant returns sector. Davis (1998) shows how costly trade in both the constant and the increasing returns sectors substantially alters the equilibrium outcome. 2 The counterfactual prediction of FPE could be avoided by allowing for di¤erent productivities across countries in the homogeneous good sector. However, these productivities would not be endogenous.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we look at the role of country size on wages and welfare. Second, we analyse the impact of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) on the partner countries and the left-out country. In this study, we consider the simplest setting allowing for third country e¤ects and terms-of-trade movements, namely a three-country Krugman model (1980), for which a unique equilibrium is shown to exist.
The …rst set of results relate to size and neighbouring e¤ects. When some country increases in size, its relative wage increases, as well as that in a small and near country, while that in a large and distant country falls. This result extends the size e¤ect emphasized by Krugman (1980) in the case of two countries by introducing a neighbouring e¤ect, which translates how the size e¤ect propagates across countries. The increase in market potential is larger in a neighbouring country than in a distant one. In terms of welfare, all countries gain from the increase in some country size because world production and consumption end up increasing.
The second set of results relate to the consequences of PTAs. When some countries engage in a PTA, the integration e¤ect induces relative prices including relative wages to increase in the integrating area. By raising the export price in the partner countries, the e¤ect of a PTA is to improve the terms-of-trade in the integrating area, while lowering that in the excluded country.
While a PTA is bene…cial to the partner countries in utility terms, it is always detrimental to the third country because the latter one does not bene…t from the integration e¤ect and is exposed to a negative price e¤ect: it has to import goods produced at higher costs in the integrating area.
Third, a natural question is whether our PTAs results could hold in N -country environments.
We provide several examples for which this is the case.
A key property of Krugman´s (1980) framework is that shocks a¤ecting labour endowments and trade costs transmit either through terms-of-trade or production relocation e¤ects. order to account for general equilibrium adjustments, they rely on a numerical approximation procedure.
In the context of an Armington structure, Arkolakis et al. (2012) have shown that the change in welfare associated with any foreign shock can be calculated from the change in the share of domestic expenditure. This important result provides a method for estimating welfare gains irrespective of the source of foreign shocks. However, their approach provides no indication on how these shares of domestic expenditures could respond to these various shocks in a general equilibrium environment. In contrast to their analysis, our work identi…es the e¤ect all types of shocks including domestic ones on countries'welfare in the context of Krugman's framework.
By doing so, we also provide the corresponding implicit changes in the shares of domestic expenditure used by Arkolakis et al. (2012) . Behrens et al. (2007) . Here, in contrast to the models relying on FPE, the integration e¤ect always dominates the price e¤ect irrespective of country sizes and of the spatial distribution of resources across countries, so that welfare always increases in the integrating area.
Under FPE, falling trade costs between countries concluding the PTA is accompanied by the relocation of …rms to the PTA partners, while it does not lead to terms-of-trade movements.
The relocation of …rms from the third country to the PTA partners implies a worse access of the third country to the manufacturing varieties. In contrast, in this paper, another rationale for the lower utility in the third country is provided. The falling trade costs between PTA partners raise prices and wages in the integrating area relative to the price level in the third country.
As a result, consumers in the left-out country su¤er a terms-of-trade loss because they have to import varieties produced at higher costs in the partner countries, which lowers their welfare. According to us, this is a step forward in better understanding general third country e¤ects (among which FTA interdependence is an important particular case) in international trade.
Our model derives implications not only for PTA members but also for left-out countries.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The three-country model of international trade under imperfect competition is introduced in Section 1. Section 2 presents some preliminary results of the model. In Section 3, we analyse the role of country size and the impact of a PTA on wages and welfare. Section 4 extends the PTA results to several N -country economies.
Section 5 concludes.
The Model
The economy consists of three countries and a manufacturing sector producing a di¤eren-tiated good. The mass of immobile workers in country i is denoted by L i . Without loss of generality, we assume that the total mass of workers is
The utility of an individual in country i is given by Dixit-Stiglitz preferences
where q ji (v) is the amount of variety v produced in country j and consumed in country i, V j is the set of varieties produced in country j, and > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. The budget constraint of a worker in country i earning a wage w i is given by
where p ji (v) is the delivery price of variety v produced in country j and consumed in country i.
In order to simplify the notation, we drop the variety label v from now on. The maximisation of utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (2) yields the following worker's demand in country i for a variety produced in country j:
with the price index P i in country i given by
where n k is the mass of …rms located in country k.
Assuming iceberg trade costs, ij > 1 units of a variety have to be shipped from country i for one unit of that variety to reach country j(6 = i). We also assume that these trade costs are symmetric ij = ji and ii = 1.
The production technology requires a …xed and a constant marginal labour requirements, labeled f and c respectively. 3 In order to satisfy the demand q ij L j in country j, each …rm in 3 Because immobile labour is the only production factor, the equilibrium number of …rms in each country turns out to be constant. As a result, there is no production relocation e¤ect à la Krugman (1980) . country i has to produce ij q ij L j units. Thus, the pro…t of a …rm in country i is given by
By plugging the worker´s demand (3) into expression (5), pro…t maximisation with respect to prices yields
By assuming free entry and exit of manufacturing …rms, pro…t (5) is zero. Given that p ij = p ii ij , we have
Because labour inputs are given by the second bracketed terms in expression (5), the labour market clearing condition is
Using relations (6), (7), and (8), the equilibrium number of …rms is proportional to the number of workers as follows:
By substituting relations (6) and (9) into the pro…t expression (5), we have
Wages w i are determined by these three equilibrium conditions. By Walras' law, one of these conditions is redundant, so that labour in some country can serve as numéraire.
The equilibrium utility in country i is given by
where wages are evaluated at equilibrium (10).
Preliminary Results
First of all, as stated in previous section already, we assume that shipping a manufacturing variety from one country to another is costly, so that we exclude the case of costless trade ij = 1,
ASSUMPTION 1 For any distinct i; j; k 2 f1; 2; 3g, ij > 1.
Assumption 1 implies costly international trade and excludes perfect integration between
countries. This assumption is in no way restrictive given that otherwise, the number of countries would reduce to two or less.
We now show that our model is general enough to encompass both the direct-and the indirect-shipping of goods. While ij represents the direct-trade cost between countries i and j, the product ik jk corresponds to the trade cost between these countries when the good is shipped via country k. The former trade cost is more costly than the latter one if, for instance, a very high tari¤ is imposed between countries i and j. In this case, direct trade is more costly than trade via a third country. However, should this arises, it could only be so for one pair of countries, not more. To see this, denote the largest trade cost by ij so that kl ij , 8k; l, where i 6 = j and k 6 = l. In particular, this implies that ik ij < ij jk and jk ij < ij ik , for k di¤erent from i and j, which means that at least two triangle inequalities are always satis…ed. In other words, direct trade cannot be more costly than indirect trade for two pairs of countries. This is because the presence of two very costly direct-shipping routes makes indirectshipping simply not possible in our three-country model, as it would involve using two non-costly shipping routes.
Two cases may arise:
ik ij jk ; ij < ik jk ; and jk < ij ik :
In case (i), direct trade is less costly than trade via a third country for any pair of countries, so that it involves direct-shipping only, and the triangle inequality always holds. An example of this situation is when trade costs correspond to distance-related transport costs.
In case (ii), direct trade is more costly than trade via a third country for one pair of countries (i; k) and the triangle inequality is violated for that pair of countries. In this latter case, we will assume that …rms transport goods from country i to country k via country j rather than directly so that the e¤ective trade cost ik is given by ij jk . For example, if tari¤s between countries i and k are very high, then …rms will avoid direct trade by shipping goods via the third country j in order to reduce trade costs. Note that case (ii) is more likely to occur in international trade than in interregional trade because within a country trade costs increase in the geographical distance.
To make our model as general as possible and so as to encompass the possibility of indirect- 
From now on, in order to simplify the writing, we drop the´notation and de…ne the freeness of 
We now propose a useful way of restating the wage and utility equations (10) and (11).
LEMMA 1 Wages and utilities are determined by
where v i stands either for w i or U
Proof. This result has been proved by Tabata et al. (2013) in the case of an in…nite-dimensional economy. For the sake of clarity, we now show the validity of the proposed decomposition (13) .
By using the freeness of trade notation, wage equations (10) can be rewritten as
By making the following substitution
where C is some positive constant, we get
By de…ning v i = w i , we have
where " = ( 1)= 2 (0; 1). Moreover, using U i = w i =P i yields
1 . This means that the equilibrium utility in country i depends on the local wage only. As a consequence, the equilibrium equations (14) i and considering C = 1. In the rest of the paper, we normalize C = 1.
To analyse the equilibrium conditions (13), it is convenient to de…ne the map F as follows
where
i . The Jacobian matrix D v F of these equations is given by
The freeness of trade matrix and the Jacobian of the equilibrium map have a positive determinant.
Proof. First, notice that the determinant of the freeness of trade matrix can be written as Then, by using the triangle inequalities (12), we get det 3 > 0.
Second, by using the expression (16) of the Jacobian matrix D v F , we have
We now address the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 1
The model admits a unique equilibrium.
Proof. First, rewrite F as I H so that the map H is de…ned by
Let =min ij and observe that H maps D =
where the total labour constraint ( by considering its graph in the plane (v; "). When " = 0, the solution v is unique given the expression of the equilibrium map
The local behavior of v(") around " = 0 is given by the implicit function theorem
By Lemma 2, det D v Kj "=0 = det D v F j "=0 6 = 0, which means that the homotopy is regular when " = 0 (i.e. locally, v can be seen as a function of "). Note that the homotopy remains regular as " increases away from zero as det
This ensures that the curve v(") de…nes a smooth path starting at " = 0, thereby preventing the path to bifurcate or to exhibit an horizontal tangency in the plane (v; "). Regarding the global behaviour of v("), the path emanating from " = 0 is necessarily unique. This is because any other path would intersect " = 0, which would imply multiplicity of equilibria when " = 0.
While equations (15) will be used to study utilities, we still need to derive equations helpful to analyse relative wages across countries. By Walras'law, variables v 1 and v 2 can be expressed relative to v 3 by normalizing v 3 = 1: 8 > > < > > :
We now show that admissible relative v's belong to the triangle de…ned by the sides
obtained by by setting L i = 0 and eliminating z j and z k from (13) for distinct i, j, k. The three corners of correspond to the cases L i = 1, 8i. This is because side (l i = 0) corresponds to , which corresponds to the corner opposite to side l 2 = 0. In the rest of the paper, we focus on the case L i > 0, 8i. Otherwise the number of countries would reduce to two or less. When L i > 0, 8i, it must be that l i > 0, 8i, meaning that admissible (v 1 ; v 2 )'s belong to the interior of triangle .
Comparative Statics
First, we examine the general equilibrium impacts of an exogenous increase in country size on utilities and relative wages. We then study the consequences of a PTA by considering an exogenous increase in the freeness of trade between the countries concluding the PTA.
Size e¤ ect

PROPOSITION 2
For any distinct i; j; k 2 f1; 2; 3g,
The proof is contained in Appendix A.
Proposition 2(i) implies that the larger a country, the higher its relative wage. This result corresponds to the size e¤ ect emphasized by Krugman (1980, p. 954) in the case of two countries.
When the size of the local market increases, local …rms face lower average transportation costs.
In equilibrium, that competitive advantage is o¤set by higher relative local wages. Proposition 2(ii) shows that the size e¤ect may a¤ect neighbouring countries in a multi-country setting. This neighbouring e¤ ect says that a country size increase will tend to increase (resp. lower) relative wages in other countries provided that they are low enough (resp. high enough). To interpret this result, observe …rst that w k =w i < jk = ij 1= as long as country k is su¢ ciently small and the freeness of trade between countries j and k su¢ ciently high. This means that an exogenous increase in the population of some country tends to increase (resp. lower) the relative wage in a small and near country (resp. a large and distant country). The neighbouring e¤ ect translates how the size e¤ ect propagates across countries: when some country increases in size, the increase in market potential is larger in a neighbouring country than in a remote one. Also, this impact is larger on a small country than on a large one as smaller countries are more sensitive to foreign shocks.
PROPOSITION 3 dU i =dL j > 0; 8i and j.
The proof is contained in Appendix B.
An increase in the local labour force is bene…cial to all countries because world consumption ends up increasing. While the larger number of manufacturing workers leads to more local varieties and to higher output, the increase in demand raises the relative wage of local workers, which in turn makes local goods more expensive. Though the impact on relative wages in other countries may be positive or negative (depending on the sign of the neighbouring e¤ect), Proposition 3 shows that overall, all countries gain in terms of welfare when some country increases in size.
We now look at the corresponding impact on trade ‡ows. Let ij denote the share of country j 's total expenditure on goods imported from country i. 
The Impact of a PTA
In this section, we consider the scenario where countries j and k engage in a PTA. 
PROPOSITION 4
The proof is contained in Appendix C.
Proposition 4 states that a PTA between two countries via a reduction in their mutual trade cost increases their wages relative to that of the third country. The integration e¤ ect due to a better market access between PTA partners induces the price index in the integrating area to fall and local consumption to rise. However, because supply is …xed, the price e¤ ect leads prices and relative wages in the integrating area to rise so as to restore equilibrium. Because the export price is proportional to the wage in the export country (see expression (6)), this price e¤ect improves the terms-of-trade of the integrating area, while lowering that of the excluded country. The implication on welfare is derived in the following Proposition.
PROPOSITION 5
For any distinct i; j; k 2 f1; 2; 3g, (i) dU j =d jk > 0 and dU k =d jk > 0.
(ii) dU i =d jk < 0.
The proof is contained in Appendix D. In contrast, in this paper, the falling trade costs jk between PTA partners raise prices and relative wages in the integrating countries j and k, with respect to the price level in the third country i (see Proposition 4) . As a result, consumers in the third country do not bene…t from the integration e¤ect and are exposed to a negative price e¤ect. They su¤er a terms-of-trade loss because they have to import the varieties produced at higher costs in the partner countries, which lowers their welfare.
Some Extensions to N Countries
In this section, we extend our PTA results to several N -country economies.
We …rst consider the case of PTA partners 1 and 2 trading symmetrically with N 2 symmetric third countries. Country sizes are given by 
where 12 denotes the freeness of trade between countries 1 and 2, 13 (resp. 23 ) that between country 1 (resp. country 2) and any third country, and that between any two third countries.
To keep the example tractable, we assume > maxf 12 ; 13 ; 23 g. As third countries are of identical size, the equilibrium equations (13) (ii) dU 3 =d 12 < 0 for any third country.
The proof is contained in Appendix E.
Our second extension explores a di¤erent special case. Here trade relationships between countries are assumed to be symmetric, while country sizes L i may be asymmetric. The freeness of trade between any two countries is given by . The equilibrium equations (13) can then be written as
Our last extension considers the case of low or high product di¤erentiation between varieties
No restriction is placed on country sizes nor on trade costs. The equilibrium equations (13) are now given by
The PTA results corresponding to these last extensions are now summarized.
PROPOSITION 7
When trade relationships are symmetric or when product di¤ erentiation among varieties is either very low or very high,
for any distinct countries i, j, and k.
The proof is contained in Appendix F.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have built a three-country model of international trade under monopolistic competition. In contrast to the existing literature which relies on FPE across countries, our approach accounts for prices e¤ects and terms-of-trade movements.
We have determined the role of country size on relative wages and welfare. When some country increases in size, its relative wage increases, as well as that in a small and near country, while that in a large and distant country falls. The size e¤ect, emphasized by Krugman in the case of two countries, propagates across countries, giving rise to a neighbouring e¤ect: the increase in market potential is larger in a neighbouring country than in a distant one. We have also determined the impact of a PTA on the participating countries and the left-out country.
A PTA increases the relative wage, the welfare, and the terms-of-trade in the integrating area, while lowering those in the third country. These PTA results have been extended to a number of multi-country economies involving country size or trade cost asymmetries.
Further research aiming at a better understanding of third-country e¤ects is still needed. In particular, quantifying the changes derived in the present work would be especially important as it could only enlarge the set of theoretically-informed PTAs propositions to be tested empirically.
Also, extending our approach to multi-industry environments would be particularly relevant.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2
It is su¢ cient to show the signs of d(w 2 =w 3 )=dL 1 and d(w 2 =w 3 )=dL 2 as the other results follow from a symmetric argument. Consider the relative wages equations (17) . The corresponding
The inverse of the Jacobian matrix, det(
(i) By applying the implicit function theorem to the relative wage equilibrium conditions (17), we get
We show that g 1 (v 1 ; v 2 ) > 0 in the interior of triangle . This is to equivalent to show that the curve 1 de…ned by the expression g 1 (v 1 ; v 2 ) = 0 does not intersect triangle , except at corner
). For this purpose, we evaluate g 1 along the three sides of triangle .
First, solving l 1 (v 1 ; v 2 ) = 0 for v 2 and plugging the solution into g 1 lead to Hence, g 1 is positive along the three sides of triangle except at the vertex (1= 12 ; 23 = 12 ).
By a continuity argument, g 1 is positive inside .
(ii) Similarly, we get
Then,
Appendix B: Proofs of Proposition 3 and Corollary 1
Regarding the proof of Proposition 3, it su¢ ces to show that dU 1 =dL 1 > 0 and dU 3 =dL 1 > 0 as the other results follow from a symmetric argument. By applying the implicit function theorem to the utility equilibrium equations (15), we get
First, we derive the inverse of the Jacobian matrix D v F 1 . Direct computations allow to
Second, we get
where Lemma 2 has been used. We also have
by making use of the triangle inequality 13 > 12 23 .
So as to prove Corollary 1, the trade share ij is rewritten by using Lemma 1 as follows
The above proof of Proposition 3 ensures that dw j =dL i > 0 since dv j =dL i > 0. We then 
Notice that det(D v G) D v G 1 has already been derived in expression (22) in Appendix A.
Using x i = z i =v i and (13), we get
where We show that g 2 (v 1 ; v 2 ) > 0 in the interior of triangle . This is to equivalent to show that the curve 2 de…ned by the expression g 2 (v 1 ; v 2 ) = 0 does not intersect triangle . For this purpose, we evaluate g 2 along the three sides of triangle .
First, solving l 1 (v 1 ; v 2 ) = 0 for v 2 and plugging the solution into g 2 lead to We readily have
]. Hence, the curve 2 does not intersect (l 3 = 0) inside triangle .
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 5
It su¢ ces to show that dU 1 =d 12 > 0 and dU 3 =d 12 < 0 as the other results follow from a symmetric argument. By applying the implicit function theorem to the equilibrium equations
We make use of expression (23) of (D v F ) 1 derived in the proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix B.
First, note that (D v F ) can be expressed in terms of z's only
By direct inspection of this expression, each term in the sum is positive. Hence dv 1 =d 12 > 0.
Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 6
From the utility equilibrium conditions (18) , the equilibrium map F can be de…ned by
The corresponding Jacobian matrix D v F is given by 0
By applying the implicit function theorem to the equilibrium equations (24), we get
where [1+"x 3 (1+(N 3) )] (z 2 + "x 2 z 2 "x 2 z 1 12 )+(N 2)" 2 x 2 x 3 23 (z 1 13 z 2 23 ) :
By using the utility equilibrium conditions (24), and substituting x i by z i =v i , we have By inspection of this expression, we get dv 1 =d 12 > 0. By a symmetry argument, we also have dv 2 =d 12 > 0.
Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 7
First, we consider the case of symmetric trade relationships. It su¢ ces to show that dU 3 =d 12 < 0 and dU 1 =d 12 > 0. From the utility equilibrium conditions (19) , the equilibrium map F can be de…ned by This because these elements can be written as
where it can be shown that det(D v F ) > 0. Hence dv 3 =d 12 < 0.
(ii) Similarly, dv 1 =d 12 = z 2 D v F 
From expressions (28) and (29), we have where the last equality is due to x i = z i =v i and equation (26).
Second, under su¢ ciently high di¤erentiation of varieties (" ! 0), we have
where x i = z i =v i . This implies that dv k =d ij < 0.
We also have
1:
Finally, under su¢ ciently low di¤erentiation of varieties (" ! 1), we get ! 1 and ij ! 0 for all i 6 = j. 
